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Abstract
When designing a product, the earlier the potential risks can be identified, the more costs can be saved, as it is easier to
modify a design in its early stages. Several methods exist to analyze the risk in a system, but all require a mature design.
However, by applying the concept of “common interfaces” to a functional model and utilizing a historical knowledge
base, it is possible to analyze chains of failures during the conceptual phase of product design. This paper presents a method
based on these common interfaces to be used in conjunction with other methods such as risk in early design to allow a more
complete risk analysis during the conceptual design phase. Finally, application of this method is demonstrated in a design
setting by applying it to a thermal control subsystem.
Keywords: Conceptual Design; Function-Based Design; Probabilistic Risk Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Many techniques exist today for the analysis of risk in mature
systems. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques,
such as failure modes and effects analysis (US Department
of Defense, 1980), event tree analysis (ETA; Frank, 1999),
and fault tree analysis (FTA; Vesely et al., 1981), allow de-
signers to identify not only areas of failures in a system (fail-
ure modes and effects analysis) but also how these failures
spread through a system. Once identified, these areas of
risk can be modified, thereby controlling or eliminating their
danger to the system. However, these PRA assessment tools
require a physical form of a product to complete the analysis,
making them far less useful during the conceptual design
phase, when such a form of the product does not exist.
Recent research efforts have made strides to address risk in
the conceptual design phase. The risk in early design (RED;
Grantham Lough, 2005) method determines the consequence
and likelihood of failure based on the functions of a design,
allowing an analysis to be performed on a product whose
physical form has not been determined. Despite this great
step forward, RED fails to consider how the functions affect
each other.
Aviation safety experts have realized for some time that
aircraft incidents and accidents almost always result from a
series of events (National Academy of Sciences, 1998). The
Columbia Space Shuttle accident, for example, was caused
when preexisting damage to the leading edge of the left
wing propagated to the internal structure of the wing and
caused the destruction of the shuttle (CAIB, 2003). Similarly,
the Ariane 5 launcher failed when code in the inertial refer-
ence system failed and propagated to maneuvering thrusters,
causing the craft to break up (Lions, 1996).
To find potential failures such as these during the concep-
tual stage of design, this paper describes a risk assessment
method that shows how these failures propagate through a
system and affect chains of functions in a system. By using
this method during the conceptual design phase, potential
chains of failures can be identified and the potential damage
they pose can be controlled or eliminated.
2. BACKGROUND
Function-based failure propagation has its roots in several
other failure analysis and product design techniques. These
product design techniques include functional modeling and
the functional basis, which are necessary to understand func-
tion-based failure propagation. The risk analysis tools RED,
ETA, FTA, and design change prediction are the basis for
function-based failure propagation. This section presents a
background of these techniques and tools.
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2.1. Functional modeling and the functional basis
A functional model is a form-independent model that de-
scribes a system based on the functions that it performs
(Otto & Wood, 2001). Because of this, a functional model
can be generated before components have been selected or
a physical design exists. This model plots flows of material,
signal, and energy as they pass through the system, are acted
on by functions of the system, and then exit. These flows are
generated from high-level customer needs, and are plotted on
a black box model of the system, consisting of only the most
basic function of the system. This general function is then fur-
ther defined, following each individual flow fromwhere it en-
ters to where it leaves, generating chains of functions that act
on that flow. These chains of functions are the combined
to form the functional model of the system (Cross, 2000;
Otto & Wood, 2001; Dym & Little, 2004). Figure 1 depicts
an example of this for the main rotor of a helicopter. As
shown in the figure, the main rotor regulates, transfers, reg-
ulates, guides, and exports mechanical energy.
Although such a model is helpful, without a single lan-
guage used consistently it is impossible to uniformly measure
model results or accurately convey data to others. Therefore,
to allow better communication of functional models, a func-
tional basis was developed (Stone &Wood, 2000; Hirtz et al.,
2002). This basis defines function “verbs” such as “import,”
“convert,” and “mix,” and flow “objects” such as “energy,”
“solid,” and “status signal.” By combining these into verb–
object pairs, defined functions are created, showing not
only what the function does but also what it acts on. With
this functional basis in use, historical function data can be
quantified uniformly and communicated clearly. This advan-
tage allows the use of such conceptual design tools as the
function failure design method (FDM; Stone et al., 2004),
the concept generator (Bryant et al., 2005), and the RED
method (Grantham Lough, 2005).
2.2. RED
RED collects failure data from historical events, and com-
bines it with functional models to perform risk analysis as
early as the conceptual phase of product design (Grantham
Lough, 2005). RED presents a listing of function–failure
mode pairs and a listing of the consequence and likelihood
of each pair as an integer from 1 to 5. It presents these results
in both a list as well as plotted on a fever chart, making it easy
to see where potential failures lie, and the overall risk of a fail-
ure in a system occurring. RED allows even novice engineers
or those unfamiliar with the systems being analyzed to per-
form a detailed analysis on that system, as it identifies histor-
ical risks automatically. Further, RED provides multiple
methods for calculating the consequences and likelihoods
of the function–failure pairs, depending on whether the sys-
tem is human centric or unmanned and whether it is a subsys-
tem or system level design.
An example of a RED output is shown in Figure 2. Each
function–failure mode combination is followed by two num-
bers: the consequence and likelihood, respectively. Each
combination of consequence and likelihood corresponds to
one of the colored grids on the fever chart. The number in
each grid represents the number of function–failure pairs
that have that consequence and likelihood, and the color of
each grid gives the general risk of that pair. Red elements
are high risk, yellow are moderate risk, and green are low
risk. The 21 listed function–failure pairs in Figure 2 are
only part of the total 377 pairs returned from RED, of which
9 are high risk, 147 are moderate risk, and 221 are low risk. A
greater description of this RED output is given in Section 4.1.
RED can detect specific function–failure pairs during the
conceptual design phase; however, each entry returned is
regarded as a separate and singular case, not part of any other
failure (Grantham Lough et al., 2006a). Thus, this method
does not consider combinations of failures or their sequence.
Fig. 1. A black box and functional model.
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2.3. ETA
ETA is a risk analysis technique that uses forward logic to
plot a path from an initial failure to its potential outcomes
(Frank, 1999). Starting with the initiating failure, termed an
initiating event, paths called branches are created along other
events that can occur after the initiating event, in approxi-
mately chronological order. Each of these events is limited
to an outcome of success or failure, creating a number of
unique branches made up of the successes and failures of
the entire chain of events (USNR Commission, 1975).
An example of an event tree is shown in Figure 3. Continu-
ing with the previous example of the helicopter, this event
tree starts with the initiating event of the fuel filter becoming
blocked. Each of the events that follows, the fuel bypass op-
erating, the fuel line remaining connected, and the rotor shaft
remaining connected, are arrayed in chronological order. Of
important note is that after the failures of the bypass and
the fuel line, no other events are considered. After these
events fail, each event that occurs after would be moot, as
the system would have already failed. This pruning of the
tree by removing branches that are either redundant or other-
wise have no meaning can greatly simplify an event tree (Ku-
mamoto & Henley, 1996). For this system, success is only
achieved if the bypass operates, the fuel line remains con-
nected, and the shaft to the rotors also remains connected.
ETA focuses on chains of events, showing the many differ-
ent paths that can lead to success or failure in a system. How-
ever, they cannot handle parallel events well, as they require
the events used to be close to chronological order. Further-
more, they are binary in nature, and do not deal with events
that have more than two outcomes. Event tree can also
grow very large, numbering a total of 2n possible branches
for n events (Kumamoto & Henley, 1996). Finally, this
Fig. 2. The risk in early design output at the human centric, subsystem level for a turboshaft helicopter. [A color version of this figure can
be viewed online at journals.cambridge.org/aie]
Fig. 3. Event tree analysis for a helicopter.
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analysis focuses on events occurring in a mature system, mak-
ing it ill suited for use during the conceptual design phase.
2.4. FTA
In contrast to ETA, FTA uses backward logic to plot a path
from an ultimate failure to each of its potential causes (Vesely
et al., 1981; Kumamoto &Henley, 1996). Beginning with the
ultimate failure or fault, potential causes of the failure are
found and plotted, using Boolean gates such as “And” or
“Or.” For each of these causes, more faults are identified, un-
til the most basic causes of the top fault are found. Using the
tree structure and the probabilities of each fault occurring, the
probability of each branch of faults leading to the top fault
is calculated, as well as the total probability of the top fault
occurring (Bedford & Cooke, 2001).
An example fault tree is shown in Figure 4. In this example,
as in the previous, the helicopter is used. The top fault is ac-
tually the failure event from the previous example, the heli-
copter rotors loosing power. From this, there are two events
connected by the Or gate, the shaft becomes disconnected
and no fuel reaches the engine. As either of the events can
cause power not to reach the rotor, the Or gate is used. Sim-
ilarly, the faults that cause the no fuel fault can happen inde-
pendently, also requiring the Or gate. The causes of the fuel
line blockage, however, must occur together, and thus require
an And gate. In addition to these two gates, there are addi-
tional gates, such and the “Exclusive Or” or “Inhibit” gates,
but these gates are merely simplifications of combinations
of And and Or gates or special circumstances (Kumamoto
& Henley, 1996; Schellhorn et al., 2002).
FTA, like ETA, focuses on chains of faults; however, un-
like event trees, fault trees can handle parallel events well.
Also, each fault tree created is specifically tailored to its top
fault, focusing in on a particular fragment of the system rather
than the system as a whole (Vesely et al., 1981). However,
fault trees can become very complex and difficult to under-
stand, and can become very large as the number of faults be-
come large (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). Fault trees are also
acyclic, and cannot be used to model systems that can be
kept running with repairs, instead requiring the model to treat
the system as always failing or always succeeding if it fails
(Anand & Somani, 1998). Finally, although FTA does model
chains of faults as they spread through a system, it, too, works
best on a mature system, and is thus not suited for use in the
conceptual design phase.
2.5. Change prediction
Change prediction uses the “common interfaces” between
components as a means to track how changes can propagate
in a design (Eckert et al., 2004). This is based on the theory
that changing a single component or system in a design ef-
fects other systems or components in the design through the
interfaces common to each component, such as a shaft or
common mounting. Based on the engineering opinions of a
team of experts, data on the relationship of components in
a complex design is collected, as well as the likelihood that
a change in one component will propagate to anther it is de-
pendent on. In addition, each component has a consequence
of change representing the impact of that change to itself and
other components. Using these three pieces of information, a
model of the change in a system is made, consisting of trees
that show all the ways that one component can be affected by
another component. These trees are then used to calculate the
combined likelihood and consequence of a change propagat-
ing from one component to another (Clarkson et al., 2001).
This method tracks changes to a design as they propagate
through a system, and lists the most likely components to reg-
ulate changing if a single other component is changed. How-
ever, the data used is based solely on the opinions of experts,
rather than historical data. In addition, this method requires
that a similar design already exists, and cannot be used on
an original design (Jarratt et al., 2002). Finally, although
the method tracks the propagation of changes, it focuses on
components rather than functions, and is thus not suited for
use in conceptual design.
3. FUNCTION-BASED FAILURE PROPAGATION
METHOD
Despite their advantages, each of the above failure analysis
methods lack the ability to either be used during the conceptual
design phase or the ability to analyze chains of failures. TheFig. 4. Fault tree analysis for a rotor that is losing speed.
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function-based failure propagation method presented here at-
tempts to remedy this by providing a means to analyze the
likelihood of failures to propagate from function to function,
as an addition to other methods such as RED to allow for a
more complete picture of potential failures in a system during
conceptual design.
3.1. Function-based failure propagation
During the conceptual design phase, only the component-in-
dependent functional model exists. Instead of components,
functions representing the basic operation the system per-
forms are used to model the product. These functions are
linked by flows representing the materials, energies, and
signals the system acts upon. As these functions are linked
by their flows, the concept of the “common interface” from
change prediction is extended to the functional model.
Thus, to understand how a failure might propagate in a sys-
tem, a common interface of the flows linking the functions
is used to map out failure paths. Following this, a function
that fails has a likelihood of propagating its failure to another
function downstream along one of the flows connecting them.
These failure propagations can be mapped to a tree similar
in nature to a fault tree, connecting functions with And and
Or gates. Thus, for a single function, all of the potential
root causes of its failure can be found using backward logic
and the dependencies based on the common interface of
flow. Once these trees exist, past data on failure propagation
from a knowledge base is used to calculate likelihoods of
propagation. These likelihoods can then be used to calculate
the likelihood of a function failing because of another func-
tion’s failure propagating to it.
3.2. New failure modes
It is assumed in this research that propagating failures can be
initiated by any failure mode. Likewise, the failures caused by
their propagation can also be any of the existing failure
modes. However, there are two other ways that a failure can
propagate to another function. These “new” modes are not
traditional failure modes, in that the function they occur to
is perfectly capable of carrying out its function. For these
two failure modes, the failure is caused either by the lack of
a necessary supply or as a “failure carrier” that causes a later
function to fail because it operated normally.
The first of these two new failure modes is one in which the
function the failure propagates to continues to function nor-
mally. This “no failure” failure mode acts as a carrier that
passes the failure off to another function, potentially causing
it to fail. An example of this failure mode would be a fuel/air
mixture chamber, represented by the function “mix liquid and
gas” and shown in Figure 5. The flow of “mixture” represents
liquid fuel mixed with contaminates. One failure mode of the
function “separate mixture” might allow the mixture through
without separating it. The function immediately downstream,
“mix liquid and gas,” continues to perform its task normally,
and thus does not fail. However, the function immediately
after, “convert mixture to chemical energy” fails because of
the potential contaminate in the mixture.
The second of these new failure modes is failure because of
no flowexisting. Certain functions, when they fail, cause a flow
that leaves the function to cease. Thus, any function that was
connected to that flow downstream of that function would
fail because there would be nothing for the function to operate
on. The example shown in Figure 6 illustrates this failuremode.
If the function “convert mixture to chemical energy” were to
fail, there would be no new chemical energy leaving the func-
tion, resulting in a case where there is “no flow.” The function
“convert chemical energy to mechanical energy” would also
fail, because of no chemical energy being available to the func-
tion, which is necessary for the function to carry out its task.
Likewise, “transfer mechanical energy” would also fail, as
no mechanical energy exists to be transmitted.
Each of these two failure modes allows the data collection
procedure to go more smoothly. Without the “no-failure” fail-
ure mode, it would be impossible to advance passed functions
that did not fail, yet help propagate the failure to others. Like-
wise, without the “no flow,” it becomes impossible to deal
with functions that areworking properly, but are not receiving
the flow they need to truly “function.” These two new modes
are essential to properly plot a path from the initial failure to
the final failure in a system.
3.3. Data collection
Before function-based failure propagation is applied, data on
the likelihood of failures propagating through functions must
be collected. This data is a historical record of the number of
times a failure has propagated along a particular path of func-
tions in currently existing products. Using this data, the like-
lihood of such a propagation occurring again in a new
Fig. 5. An example of “no-failure” failure mode. [A color version of this figure can be viewed online at journals.cambridge.org/aie]
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conceptual product can be calculated. For this paper, the data
used was obtained from National Transportation Safety Board
accident reports covering Bell 206 helicopters. Function–fail-
ure mode combinations are identified from the failure reports
such as this, and recorded. The path from the initial failure to
the final failure is then identified and plotted on a functional
model of the product, and each instance of propagation is re-
corded. These results are then tabulated into a matrix knowl-
edge base (Grantham Lough & Krus, 2007).
For any given function pair, there are many different
possible failure modes that can propagate to the next function,
as well as many different flows that the failure can propagate
along. There is a good potential that each failure mode that
can propagate has its own likelihood of propagation, and a spe-
cific flow that it propagates along. However, for simplicity of
calculation, it is assumed that each failure mode has the same
likelihood of propagation, and can propagate along any flow.
The specific nature of the failure propagation, for example, either
breaking a shaft or burning up a wire to stop a motor from func-
tioning, is not as important at this stage as the fact that a
particular failure can propagate. Further, past effects gathered
in this way are representative of the functional, not component
based model of that product. Propagations in past products
that do not exist in a new conceptual product will not appear
in the functional model, and thus not effect the analysis of the
new product.
The likelihoods are calculated from the knowledge base
matrix using a modified form of the likelihood mapping
from (Grantham Lough et al., 2006b) and shown in Eq. (1).
In this equation, for an MM knowledge base matrix, N,
the likelihood for a given pair of functions i and j is li, j, and
ni, j is the value of the pair found in the knowledge base ma-
trix. These likelihoods are then recorded into a likelihood ma-
trix, L, such as one shown in Table 1. Along the left side are
the functions that initiate the failure propagations, and across
the top are the functions to which the failure propagates. The
corresponding matrix entry is the failure propagation like-
lihood for the pair. The entire table of collected data is
presented in Appendix A.




The data used in this paper are far from a complete data-
base; there are many missing function pairs and pairs that
have no data pertaining to them. Further, even more data
for the function pairs that do exist needs to be acquired to
truly verify their likelihoods. The goal of this work was not
to create a complete knowledge base, but to demonstrate a
method. For further reference, a more complete analysis of
the data collection method and how it was used to create
the knowledge base used can be found in Grantham Lough
and Krus (2007). Over time, a more complete database will
exist.
Fig. 6. An example of “no-flow” failure mode. [A color version of this figure can be viewed online at journals.cambridge.org/aie]
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mech. E.
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Distribute mech. E. 0.67
Guide mech. E. 0.33
Export mech. E.
Note: E., energy.
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3.4. Procedure
The procedure to perform function-based failure propagation
starts with constructing the functional model. From this func-
tional model, the dependencies of each function can be deter-
mined. Each function is directly dependent on functions that
are connected to it by flows. Further, as flows in a functional
model only “flow” in a single direction, functions are also de-
pendent in this same direction. As shown by the sample func-
tional model in Figure 7, function C is dependent on both
functions A and B, and function D is dependent on function
C. These dependencies are independent of the number or type
of flow between each function.
From this functional model, a functional dependency ma-
trix is generated, using the flows as the common interface.
The functional dependency matrix is populated with the like-
lihoods of propagation, taken from the historical failure
knowledge base. As shown in Table 2, the three likelihoods
from the example functional model have been placed into a
functional dependency matrix. The initiating function of the
pair is shown across the top, and the dependent function is
shown along the left. Those places with no dependency are
filled with zero, here left blank for clarity.
Using the functional dependency matrix, propagation trees
are built for each function. Starting from the function of inter-
est and using backward logic, a branch is created for each
starting function that can spread backwards to the “root” func-
tion. For the functional model in this example, the propaga-
tion tree for function D is shown in Figure 8. Functions A,
B, and C are all root functions whose failures can propagate
to function D. However, functions A and B cannot propagate
directly to function D, and must cause function C to fail, or
bypass C through “no failure” first. Thus, there are three
ways for function D to fail because of propagation: by [A
and C] or [B and C] or [C].
Using these trees, the total likelihood of failure propagation
is calculated. As shown above, the tree is a combination of
Boolean And and Or statements. Thus, using calculations for
And and Or, shown in Eqs. (2) and (3) (Kumamoto & Henley,
1996), the direct likelihoods are combined into a single total
likelihood. If in a branch there are multiple failure propagations
that have to occur together, the And calculation is used. Like-
wise, any time the branch breaks into multiple paths, the Or
calculation is used. In each of these equations, i, j, and k are
functions, where the first subject is the function being propa-
gated from and the second is the function being propagated to.
And operator:
li, j < li, k ¼ li, j  li, k (2)
Or operator:
li, j > li, k ¼ li, j þ li, k  (li, j  li, k) (3)
For this example in Figure 8, function D has three
branches, connected by the Or gate. Combining the three
branches and using (2) and (3), the total likelihood of
Fig. 7. An example functional model showing dependencies.
Fig. 8. The failure propagation tree for function D.
Table 2. Example functional dependency matrix
Initiating Function
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propagation for function D (LD) is as shown in Eqs. (4)
and (5).
LD ¼ lA,C < lC,Dð Þ j lB,C < lC,Dð Þ j lC,D (4)
LD ¼ 1 ðð1 ½1 ðð1 lA,ClC,DÞ
 ð1 lA,ClC,DÞÞÞ  ð1 lC,DÞÞ (5)
3.5. Linking to RED
Function-based failure propagation is not without its faults.
Creating trees for every function in a functional model can
be time consuming, even for small models, and some trees
have the capacity to grow very large and complex. In addi-
tion, there is no way to currently add the consequence of fail-
ure to the calculation. However, by linking function-based
failure propagation with other failure analysis methods,
such as RED, these problems can be lessened, if not removed
entirely.
The first problem is that of the time required to construct
failure propagation trees for an entire functional model. The
size and number of possible trees increases for each function
added in a chain, and each possible branch that separates from
that chain. For example, a chain of four functions with no
branches would have three possible trees: one with three
branches, one with two, and one with one. For small func-
tional models with few functions, this can be performed
quickly, but can rapidly become complex as the functional
model becomes larger and more complex. In contrast, RED
is a very rapid analysis method, requiring only the different
functions of the product in question and only moments to per-
form the calculations. If a RED analysis is performed before
attempting a function-based failure analysis, the RED results
can point to the functions that have the highest likelihood of
failure. Then, these functions can be focused on as the most
likely initiating functions for the analysis. This allows the
“trimming” of branches that are less likely to occur, allowing
the analyst to focus instead on the most likely chains of func-
tion failure.
Finally, the consequence of risk can also be addressed by
combining the analysis with RED. As above, RED illustrates
the highest risk functions and failure modes. By applying
RED results to the function chain, the best way to alter a design
to prevent a chain of failures from occurring can be found.
Function-based failure propagation is only a portion of
the conceptual design and analysis process. It requires work
from other design methods such as the functional model
and RED to make it complete, and eliminate many of its
shortcomings.
3.6. Comparisons to other methods
Function-based failure propagation addresses many of the
shortcomings of other failure analysis methods. The addition
of chains of functions based on the functional model of a
system allows the function-based failure propagation method
to demonstrate failure propagation through a system. This
provides forward logic failure propagation (similar to ETA).
Moreover, the focus on system functions, rather than compo-
nents, allows function-based failure propagation to be used
during the conceptual stage of design.
The earlier initiation of the analysis enables more design
decisions to focus on failure prevention. This type of
preliminary failure of a conceptual design is very difficult
in ETA, FTA, and change prediction analysis. Further, func-
tion-based failure propagation leverages the features of the
RED method, as described in Section 2.2. RED augments
function-based failure propagation by reducing the size and
complexity of the analysis, a common complaint about
ETA and FTA. Moreover, the use of a sufficiently populated
historical knowledge base allows for a less subjective failure
analysis.
4. VERIFICATION AND CASE STUDY
As a demonstration of how this method is useful as an anal-
ysis tool during the conceptual design phase, a verification
and a case study are presented here. The method verification
focuses on a Bell 206 helicopter, the same kind that the failure
propagation data taken for this paper comes from. The design
case study is of a thermal control subsystem, as a demonstra-
tion of how the method is used in a design setting.
4.1. Verification—Bell helicopter
For the verification of this method, the same functional model
used to collect data was used to perform an analysis, to com-
pare the likelihood values calculated to the failure chains that
occurred in the reports. As stated previously, the data col-
lected was from the Bell 206-B series and 206-L series of he-
licopters. These helicopters are turbine powered commercial
helicopters, capable of performing many corporate, law en-
forcement, military, and medical roles (Bell Helicopter Tex-
tron, 1997, 1999). The functional model shown in Figure 9
is one of the most important systems found in the helicopter,
including the fuel and air intake systems, turbine engine, main
and tail rotor assemblies, lubrication, control and sensor sys-
tems, the human interfaces, and the electrical system. The sys-
tem takes in four flows: dirty air (gas–solid mixture), dirty
liquid fuel (liquid–solid mixture), oil (liquid), and the human
passengers and pilot. It exports eight flows: four status signals
for important systems (fuel level, battery charge, and rotor
speeds), two mechanical energy flows (the movement done
by the rotors), a liquid flow (broken down oil), and the human
passengers and pilot.
A RED analysis of the system (Fig. 2) reveals that high
cycle fatigue presents the greatest risk to the helicopter,
with 9 functions failing because of it (Fig. 2, shown in red).
In terms of failure propagation, 5 of those functions (“export
solid, mechanical energy, liquid, and thermal energy” and
“secure solid”) will not propagate, as they are the last func-
tions in their chains or outside the scope of this analysis.
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The remaining 4 functions (“import liquid,” “transfer me-
chanical energy,” “distribute mechanical energy,” and “guide
liquid”) are positioned in the middle or at the beginning of
chains of functions and have a chance to propagate their fail-
ures to other functions. Below these 9 failures are the 12 most
likely moderate risk function failure pairs (Fig. 2, shown in
yellow). Of those 12, 8 are repeats of the functions above
(all save “distribute mechanical energy”), failing because of
yielding. Of the remaining 4 failure pairs, 3 fail because of
high cycle fatigue, and 1 fails because of yielding. Again, it
is assumed that each failure mode has an equal likelihood
of propagating its failure. Thus, the failure modes high cycle
fatigue and yielding are treated as having the same likelihood
of propagation.
From the RED analysis as stated above, the most important
initiating functions of a chain would be “import liquid,”
“transfer,” and “distribute mechanical energy,” and “guide
liquid” because they have the highest likelihood. Of second-
ary importance, but also necessary of consideration is the
function “guide mechanical energy.” All other functions ei-
ther end their chains or are outside the scope of this analysis.
The functions that the system is most dependent on are “ex-
port mechanical energy,” as this represents the rotors that
keep the helicopter airborne and steering properly, and “con-
vert mixture to chemical energy,” which is providing fuel to
the engine, which powers the rest of the system. Thus, failures
that can propagate to these systems are the ones that the anal-
ysis should focus on, as these chains of failure present the
greatest possible damage to the system. With these functions
as a guide, a functional dependency matrix is built, using the
function chains from the model that start with the above initi-
ating functions as “roots” from the RED analysis, and end
with the most critical functions, “export mechanical energy”
and “convert mixture to chemical energy.” This matrix is
shown in Table 3.
Based on this functional dependency matrix and the func-
tional model, propagation trees are created. Starting with the
most important functions, “export mechanical energy” and
“convert mixture to chemical energy,” backward logic is
used to trace the failure of the critical function back to the
“root” failures. These three trees are shown in Figures 10,
11, and 12. These figures represent the fuel intake subsystem,
the main rotor subsystem, and the tail rotor subsystem,
respectively. The fuel intake chain depends on the functions
“import liquid” and “guide liquid,” and thus has two
branches. The main rotor has the branches with both the



































Transfer mech. E. 0.7
Regulate mech. E. 1 0.67
Distribute mech. E. 0.33
Guide mech. E. 0.33
Export mech. E. 0.33 0.33
Note: E., energy.
Fig. 10. The fuel intake propagation tree.
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Fig. 11. The main rotor propagation tree.









most and least functions in its chain, and is dependent on
“transfer mechanical energy” and “guide mechanical en-
ergy.” For this tree, however, these two functions start three
chains. For the final tree, the tail rotor, there are again two
chains for the two initiating functions, which are the same
as for the main rotor.
Using these trees and the FDM, the likelihoods of each
chain failing are calculated. The collected results for each
tree are presented in Table 4. The values are the likelihoods
of a branch failing, and each of the totals represents the
total likelihood of any branch failing in a subsystem, and
illustrates the subsystem with the greatest likelihood of failure
because of propagation. Of the seven possible results returned
by the analysis, the two shortest branches (“guide mechanical
energy” propagating directly into “export mechanical en-
ergy” in Fig. 10 and the shorter tail rotor branch in Fig. 11)
are the most likely to fail. Despite this, the most frequent oc-
currence among the data from the NTSB reports is guide liq-
uid failing, and then propagating to the rest of the system. The
reason the other two trees have far larger likelihoods is that
any damage to the engine will cause the rest of the functions
in both rotor chains to fail. Although “transfer mechanical
energy” propagated to “regulate mechanical energy” with
the most frequency, it was rarely the initiator function, based
on the analysis of the NTSB failure reports.
Based on this analysis, additional fail-safes should be
placed to prevent “transfer mechanical energy” from failing be-
cause of high cycle fatigue and yielding. One solution would
be to improve the design of the shafts of the helicopter to
have a greater life cycle. These results verify the method as
a useful design tool. Although it was unable to verify the
most frequently initiating failure, it did identify the most fre-
quently occurring chain of failures: those of the rotors. The
rotors failed more frequently than any other system, initiated
by the “guide liquid” function as well as others.
Of particular note is the longest branch of the fuel intake
tree in Figure 9. The likelihood of propagation from “import
liquid” to “store liquid” is zero, as nowhere in the collected
data does the import function fail, and thus cannot propagate.
This is one of the limitations of this method; if the data does
not exist in the database and no similar function pairs exist,
the likelihood of the pair is either zero or must be totally sub-
jective. One possible solution for this is to consider a worst-
case scenario and set unknown likelihoods to 1, assuming that
the failure would always propagate, or that all failures have an
equal likelihood of propagation. Although not as historically
accurate, such a value would give a useful comparison for
when the data do exist.
4.2. Case study—Thermal control subsystem
As a case study, this method was applied to a thermal control
subsystem functional model. This type of subsystem may be
used on spacecraft designed by NASA’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratories Concept Design Team, Team X (Deutsch &
Nichols, 2000). This system is an example of what would
be found in several different kinds of spacecraft, including
launch vehicles (Van Wie et al., 2005). The functional model
of this system is shown in Figure 13. The system takes in
chemical energy, gas, and a mixture, and exports thermal en-
ergy and gas. These flows will be the common interfaces that
are assumed to propagate failure. For example, the gas flow
passes through the functions “import,” “store,” “supply,”
“guide,” “regulate,” “mix,” and “stop.” For example, if any
of the functions in this chain failed, the gas flow could poten-
tially propagate that failure to other functions in the chain, or
further.
Once the functional model has been constructed, a RED
analysis determines functions at risk of failure in the system.
From the RED results presented in Figure 14, the most likely
functions to fail are “export thermal energy,” “import gas,”
and “guide gas,” all because of high cycle fatigue. In addition
to these, each of the functions is slightly less likely to fail
because of thermal fatigue, but still more likely to occur than
other function–failure mode pairs. Of these, “export thermal
energy” will not propagate to other functions in the system as
it is the final function in themodel. Thus, this analysis will focus
on chains with “import” and “guide gas” as “roots” of the tree.
Another important point is to consider the potential roots of
the propagation trees, or the functions the system is most de-
pendent on. From the black box model of the thermal control
subsystem, the general function of the system is to “convert
chemical energy to thermal energy.” Thus, any failure that
causes this function to fail causes the system to fail. This func-
tion should be the tip propagation tree that is constructed for
this analysis.
Once the “tips” of the branches and the “roots” of the trees
have been determined, the functional dependency matrix can
be constructed and propagation trees built. For the thermal
Table 4. Helicopter analysis results
Likelihood
Fuel Intake Tree
Import liquid, store liquid, guide liquid, separate liquid, mix
mixture, convert mixture to chemical energy 0.000




Transfer, regulate, distribute, regulate, transfer, regulate,
guide, export mechanical energy 0.017
Transfer, regulate, guide, export mechanical energy 0.109
Guide, export mechanical energy 0.330
Total 0.413
Tail Rotor Tree
Transfer, regulate, distribute, regulate, transfer, regulate,
export mechanical energy 0.051
Transfer, regulate, export mechanical energy 0.330
Total 0.364
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control subsystem, the propagation tree has two branches,
each one starting from “import” or “guide gas.” This tree is
shown in Figure 15, and the FDM relevant to the tree is pre-
sented in Table 5, again taking the likelihoods calculated
from the helicopter accident data.
Using the collected likelihood values from the FDM and
the propagation tree, the total likelihood value for each branch
can then be calculated, as well as the total likelihood that ei-
ther initiating function propagates its failure to the “convert”
function. A sample calculation of the total likelihood of both
branches is shown below in Eqs. (6) through (10). The like-
lihoods of both branches as well as the total likelihood of
propagation are shown below in Table 6. As shown in the
table, the likelihood of “guide gas” propagating its failure to
Fig. 15. The propagation tree for the thermal control subsystem.
Table 5. Thermal control subsystem functional dependency matrix for relevant functions
Initiating Function







Convert mixture to chem. E. 0.3
Fig. 14. Risk in early design analysis for a thermal control subsystem. [A color version of this figure can be viewed online at
journals.cambridge.org/aie]
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“convert mixture to chemical energy” is four orders of mag-
nitude higher than the longer branch. When they are com-
bined together to form the total likelihood of propagation
for the tree is approximately the same as the likelihood of
the shorter branch. Thus, if prevention methods are required,
“guide gas” should be made more resistant to high cycle fa-
tigue and thermal fatigue. By preventing the failure of this
function, the propagation is most likely not to occur, as “im-
port gas” is not likely to propagate its failure.
Lbranch1 ¼ 0:03 0:03 0:17 0:03 0:07 0:3
¼ 9:64 108 (6)
Lbranch2 ¼ 0:03 0:07 0:3 ¼ 6:3 104 (7)
Ltotal ¼ Lbranch1jLbranch2 (8)
Ltotal ¼ 9:64 108 þ 6:3 104
 (9:64 108  6:3 104) (9)
Ltotal ¼ 6:3 104 (10)
5. CONCLUSION
Function-based failure propagation gives a more complete
picture of the system risk in conceptual design, as it looks
at the failures of chains of functions. It provides not only
the total likelihood that a function will have failure propa-
gated to it, but also the likelihood that any one function will
propagate a failure as based on historical data of failures. It
serves as a starting point to further risk analysis and design
decisions.
Although the method has these strengths, it has weak-
nesses. However, by pairing this method with other risk anal-
ysis techniques, the weaknesses are lessened. By defining
likelihoods of propagation based on historical data, the sub-
jectivity of the analysis is decreased, and by pairing the
method with RED, the analysis can be focused on a particular
portion of the system, saving time, as well as identifying con-
sequences to the functions that fail. However, even when
paired with RED, the data are still based on recorded failures
and cannot accurately anticipate unforeseen or new failure
propagations not recorded. Again, further analysis is required
to catch these possible failures before they can occur.
Currently, this method only focuses on the likelihoods of
failure propagation. Future work on adding the consequence
of failure to the method without the inclusion of another
method is required to make the method truly a standalone
technique. Finally, additional failure propagation data are
required to fully populate the database and help eliminate
subjectivity in the analysis.
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Import mixture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Store mixture 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide mixture 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep. mixture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stop solid 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export solid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mix liquid & gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. mixture to
chem. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. chem. E. to
mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trans. mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Regul. mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 0
Export gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export acoustic E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export thermal E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0
Export mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sense status signal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indicate status signal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Import liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Store liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Regul. liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Import human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Position human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secure human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stabil. human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. human E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. human E. to
mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0
Distrib. control signal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. mech. E. to
elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Store elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secure solid 0 0 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0















































Import mixture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Store mixture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide mixture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep. mixture 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stop solid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export solid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mix liquid & gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. mixture to
chem. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. chem. E. to
mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trans. mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Regul. mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0
Export gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export acoustic E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export thermal E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sense status signal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indicate status
signal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Import liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Store liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Regul. liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Import human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Position human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secure human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stabil. human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Export human 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. human E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. human E. to
mech. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. control
signal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. mech. E. to
elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Store elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guide elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Distrib. elec. E. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Secure solid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stop liquid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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